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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a traffic stop for an equipment violation, and his arrest for driving without
privileges and failing to provide proof of insurance, Tyler Ong's car was searched on the side of
the road. In that search, police found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the car.
Mr. Ong was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and a number of
misdemeanors.
Prior to trial, Mr. Ong filed a suppression motion, which the district court denied. He
also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that he had been denied an adequate preliminary hearing
insofar as the presiding magistrate refused to allow him to probe the constitutionality of the
search of his vehicle. That motion was also denied by the district court.
Ultimately, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ong entered conditional guilty pleas to all
of the charged offenses, specifically preserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of
his motions to suppress and dismiss. Thereafter, the district court imposed a sentence of four
years, with two years fixed, for the felony, but suspended that sentence and placed Mr. Ong on
probation. For the misdemeanors, the court sentenced Mr. Ong to a total of 120 days, all of
which had already been served.
On appeal, Mr. Ong contends the district court erred in denying his suppression motion
and/or his motion to dismiss.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Shortly after midnight, one January night, Tyler Ong was pulled over for an equipment
violation (his car was missing its front bumper).

(R., p.19.) 1 When approached by Officer

Nathan Herbig of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department, Mr. Ong indicated he did not have his
driver's license on him, but that it was expired anyway, and that he had no insurance. (Video 2
at 00:00 - 00: 17.)2 He then falsely identified himself as "Christopher Ong." 3 (See Video 2 at
01: 15 - 01 :46.)
As he spoke to Mr. Ong and Mr. Ong's passenger, Officer Herbig obviously developed a
hunch that they had drugs. Barely two minutes into the encounter, Officer Herbig asked a series
of questions revealing this suspicion. He asked, "Any drugs of any kind in the vehicle?" Getting
a negative response, he asked, "No marijuana?"

Again, he got a negative response.

Nevertheless, he continued: "No heroin? (Pause.) No meth? (Pause.) Nothing like that?" 4
(Video 2 at 02:14 - 02:27.) Moments later, upon returning to his police car, Officer Herbig
advised his partner to "keep an eye on 'em," because "I don't know what's up, but they're supersquirmy. They're super-squirmy." (02:52 - 3:01.)
After running Christopher Ong's name through dispatch and learning that his driver's
license was suspended, Officer Herbig went back to Mr. Ong's car and arrested him for driving

1

The Clerk's Record is split between two volumes. However, since Mr. Ong only cites to
Volume I of the Clerk's Record, her refers to it simply as "R."
2
There are two video recordings in the record in this case, both of which are part of Exhibit 1.
The recording with the filename "1362718" is a dashboard camera recording. It is cited herein
as "Video 1." The recording with the filename "1362773" is a body-worn camera recording. It
is cited as "Video 2."
3
Much later, on the way to jail, Mr. Ong came clean with Officer Herbig, admitting he had used
his brother's name and finally providing his real name. (Video 1 at 48:23 - 48:43, 50:03 50:07.)
2

without privileges. (Tr., p.13, Ls.4-20.) Mr. Ong was handcuffed, fully searched, and once more
asked about drugs: "Alright man, you don't have anything in those extra pants or anything like
that? No drugs? No, nothing that's gonna get you in trouble taking it into the jail?" (Video 2 at
09:20- 13:18.)
After Mr. Ong was locked in Officer Herbig's police car, Officer Herbig and his partner
removed the passenger from Mr. Ong's car. (See Video 2 at 15:03 - 15: 13.) Officer Herbig then
asked the passenger whether he had any contraband on his person and, when he said no, tried to
persuade him to let the officers search him. (Video 2 at 15:05 - 15:33.) When the passenger
politely stood firm on his Fourth Amendment rights, the officers let him go, and he apparently
left the scene on foot. 5 (See Video 2 at 15: 13 - 16:22.)
After the passenger left, Officer Herbig immediately started searching the passenger-side
and center console areas of the car. (See Video 2 at 16:26 - 17:08.) He then went around to the
driver's side, opened the door, and started searching on that side of the car. (Video 2 at 17:09 17:50.) For twenty minutes, Officer Herbig and his partner rummaged around inside Mr. Ong's
car, haphazardly sifting through the property and trash contained therein, and occasionally
pulling items out of various parts of the car and dumping them on the road in order to check
them for contraband before flinging them back inside the vehicle. (See Video 2 at 16:26 36:37.) At no point did either officer actually attempt to take a contemporaneous inventory of
the car's contents. (See Video 2 at 16:26 - 36:37.) 6 Nevertheless, the State has consistently

4

Because Mr. Ong and his passenger's responses are difficult to hear on the recording from
Officer Herbig's body cam, it is not clear whether they responded softly to his inquiries about
heroin and methamphetamine, or whether they simply shook their heads.
5
Later, the two officers discussed their hunch that the passenger had drugs on his person.
(Video 2 at 26:47 - 27:02.)
6
Shortly after Officer Herbig began rooting around in the vehicle, his partner asked if he should
start a "tow sheet," and Officer Herbig replied, "Sure." (Video 2 at 17:39 - 17:41.) However,
3

sought to justify the search of the car based on the "inventory search" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.

(See, e.g., Video 1 at 26:11 - 26:36 (Officer Herbig's

partner telling Mr. Ong, "we're towing your vehicle.

We have to inventory it"); R., p.97

(prosecution characterizing Officer Herbig's actions as "the pre-tow inventory of the vehicle"),
pp.97-101 (arguing the car was properly impounded and inventoried).)
During the course of their search, the officers found multiple items of drug paraphernalia,
as well as suspected methamphetamine. (R., p.19.)
Mr. Ong was ultimately charged with one count of felony possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) and four misdemeanors (driving without privileges, failing to
provide proof of insurance, giving a false name to police, and possessing drug paraphernalia).
(R., pp.14-15, 32-33.) He subsequently exercised his right to a preliminary hearing; however, at
that preliminary hearing, the presiding magistrate precluded the defense from asking any
questions aimed at discerning whether Mr. Ong's car was unconstitutionally searched. (See
Prelim. Tr., p.10, L. 1 - p.12, L.8.) At the end of that hearing, Mr. Ong was bound over to district
court. (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.12-20; R., p.62; see also R., pp. 79-81 (Information).)
Shortly after the preliminary hearing, Mr. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the case.
(R., pp.68-75.)

He argued that the magistrate court had failed to provide him with a full

preliminary hearing insofar as it precluded him from developing evidence that his car was
searched in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that this failure violated Mr. Ong's

neither Officer Herbig's body camera, nor his car's dashboard camera, recorded either officer
actually taking down a contemporaneous inventory as they sifted through piles of property inside
the car. (See generally Video 1 (dash cam); Video 2 (body cam).) Rather, it appears that long
after the search ended, the officers discussed the fact that they did not yet have an "inventory,"
and one officer recited from memory a couple of the items he had observed in the car: "There's
clothing, spare tire, uh, a couple backpacks .... " (See Video 1 at 41:41 -43:00.)
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rights under I.C.R. 5.l(b) and the due process clauses of the United States and Idaho
Constitutions.

(R., pp.69-73.)

Alternatively, he argued that the limited evidence that was

admitted concerning the constitutionality of the search of Mr. Ong's vehicle showed that search
was not valid under the "inventory search" exception to the warrant requirement and, therefore,
the magistrate should not have considered any of the evidence discovered in the search, leaving
insufficient evidence to have bound Mr. Ong over. (R., p.74.)
Mr. Ong also filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his vehicle.
(R., pp.77-78; see also R., pp.88-92 (memorandum in support), pp.108-09 (reply memorandum).)
He argued that the warrantless seizure and search of his vehicle violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment. (R., pp.77, 88-92, 108-09.) Specifically, he argued that the seizure and
search fit neither the "search incident to arrest" (R., pp.91-92), nor the "inventory search"
(R., pp.89-91, 108-09), exceptions to the warrant requirement.
A hearing was held on Mr. Ong's suppression motion on May 17, 2018. (See generally
Tr., pp.5-57.)

The evidence proffered with regard to the suppression motion included the

testimony of Officer Herbig, a recording from Officer Herbig' s body cam, a recording from the
officers' patrol car dash cam, a copy of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department's vehicle towing
policy, and two photos of Mr. Ong's vehicle. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties'
arguments focused solely on the "inventory search" exception-specifically, whether the
officers' decision to impound Mr. Ong's car was reasonable. (See Tr., p.40, L.21 - p.56, L.21.)
At that point, the district court took the suppression motion under advisement. (See Tr., p.56,
Ls.22-23.)
The district court held another hearing a few days later, during which it provided an oral
ruling denying Mr. Ong's suppression motion. (See Tr., p.70, L.10 - p.74, L.2.) The court
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framed the issue as follows: ''whether under Fourth Amendment case law as interpreted by the
Idaho appellate courts, the impoundment and seizure of the vehicle was reasonable, bringing it
under one of the, quote, well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement .... " (Tr., p.71,
Ls.2-7.) It ultimately ruled that the impoundment was reasonable:
[I]n looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, that being the driver
was arrested, the passenger had no driver's license on his person and left the
scene, that the registered owner of the vehicle was not present, that the vehicle
was registered a good distance from Coeur d'Alene, the time of the night that this
took place was early morning hours, actually, and that the officer's testimony that
this was a high-crime area of vehicle burglaries as reported to officers in a weekly
briefing, though contested on cross-exam, was sufficient for the Court to find it a
factor in the officer's reason for impounding the vehicle; therefore, the Court
being constrained to follow the Court of Appeals in this matter, finds the
impoundment and subsequent inventory search of the vehicle to fit within a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement; therefore, Defendant's motion is
denied.
(Tr., p.74, L.10 - p.75, L.2.)
In the meantime, the court had also heard arguments on Mr. Ong's motion to dismiss at
the May 17, 2018 hearing. (See generally Tr., pp.57-68.) Unlike the motion to suppress, which
had been taken under advisement, the district court denied the motion to dismiss outright that
day.

(See Tr., p.66, L.12 - p.67, L.4.)

The district court ruled that dismissal would be

inappropriate because a magistrate is "the gatekeeper of the evidence" at the preliminary hearing
and, as such, is "able to hear the facts that the magistrate wants to hear." (Tr., p.66, Ls.12-18.)
Besides, the court reasoned, Mr. Ong ultimately had his chance to litigate the suppression issue
at the district court level. (Tr., p.66, L.23 - p.67, L.2.)
Eventually, the district court entered a written order denying both of Mr. Ong's motions.
(R., p.175.) That order, however, did not elaborate on the rulings set forth on the record in open
court; it simply indicated that both motions were "denied for reasons stated on the record."
(R., p.175.)

6

Following the district court's denial of his motions to suppress and to dismiss, Mr. Ong
entered into a conditional plea agreement with the State, whereby he specifically preserved his
right to challenge both of the court's adverse rulings. (See R., pp.171, 185-86, 187.) Under the
terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Ong would plead guilty to all of the charged offenses, and the
State would recommend probation. (R., p.171; see Tr., p.76, L.15 - p.77, L.8.)
Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Ong pled guilty to all of the charged offenses, and the
district court accepted his pleas. (Tr., p.81, Ls.1-17, p.83, Ls.18-19.) On the felony, the district
court imposed a sentence of four years, with two years fixed, but suspended that sentence and
placed Mr. Ong on probation; on each of the four misdemeanors, the court imposed consecutive
30-day sentences (for 120 days total, which Mr. Ong had already served).

(R., pp.189-95;

Tr., p.100, Ls.2-14.)
Judgments were entered the day after sentencing. (R., pp.189-95.) The day after that,
Mr. Ong filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.199-201.) On appeal, Mr. Ong contends the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss.

7

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ong's suppression motion?

II.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ong's motion to dismiss?

8

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Ong's Suppression Motion
The United States Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in ''unreasonable
searches" of any person. U.S. CONST. amend IV. It is now well-established that "'searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,"' i.e.,
warrantless searches, "'are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."' Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); accord State v. Weaver,
127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995). It is the government's burden to "demonstrate that the search fell
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable
under the circumstances." Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290.
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is for so-called "inventory"
searches. See id. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court approved of police departments' "community caretaking function" of removing
automobiles from streets and highways to improve the flow of traffic and protect the public, and
it held that in certain circumstances police can inventory the contents of the vehicles they
impound in order to: (a) protect the owner's property from theft or vandalism, (b) immunize the
police department from claims and disputes arising out of stolen or damaged property, and (c)
protect individual police officers from dangerous items that may be inside impounded vehicles.

Id. at 369, 372.
In Opperman, the Court by no means created a blanket entitlement of police to search
whatever vehicles they wish.

Rather, the Court made it exceptionally clear that inventory

searches can occur only when, at the very least, they are undertaken pursuant to a standard police

9

procedure.

Id. at 372, 374-75.

requirements must be met:

In addition, the Court seemed to hold that additional

(1) the automobile has been lawfully impounded; (2) other

arrangements cannot be made because the owner is not present; and (3) the inventory is not a
pretext for an investigative search. Id. at 375.
Later, in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), the Supreme Court reiterated the
purpose of inventory searches of automobiles, i.e., protection of the owner’s property and
physical and legal protection of the police, as well as the requirement that inventory searches be
conducted in accordance with standard procedures and not as a pretext for investigatory searches.
Id. at 372, 375-76. In Bertine, the Court went a step further than it had in Opperman, and held
that a police officer charged with the decision of whether to impound and search a given vehicle
may be granted a degree of discretion in his decision-making process; however, it specifically
indicated that any such discretion must be “exercised according to the standard criteria” of
departmental regulations. Id. at 375-76.
Most recently, in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court again addressed the
question of how an officer may exercise his discretion in impounding and searching vehicles—
this time in the context of whether an officer had discretion to open and search a locked
container within the impounded vehicle. In that case, the Court noted that an officer “may be
allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be
opened in light of the nature of the search and the characteristics of the container itself,” but it
went on to hold that the search is impermissible in the absence of any policy specifically
addressing the opening of locked containers. Id. at 4-5.
Taken together, Opperman, Bertine, and Wells make it clear that reasonable, standardized
police department procedures are critical to legitimizing vehicle impoundments and the attendant
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inventory searches of those vehicles. Such standardized policies ensure that the practice of
impounding and searching vehicles is used for its protective purposes, not for investigative
purposes. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. However, Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized that another
layer of protection overlays the “inventory search” exception. Specifically, Idaho’s courts have
required that, regardless of compliance with departmental policy, all decisions to impound
vehicles in the first instance must still be objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Weaver, 127 Idaho
291-92; State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80-81 (1991); State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870-72
(Ct. App. 2012); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 727-28 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Bray, 122
Idaho 375 (Ct. App. 1992).
In this case, Mr. Ong concedes that the decision to impound his vehicle was consistent
with Couer d’Alene Police Department policy (see R. Ex., p.6 (providing that it is the general
policy of the Department to impound vehicles at the scene of arrest, except that officers have
discretion to not impound vehicles under certain very narrow circumstances, none of which
apply here)); however, he contends that the decision to impound his vehicle was unreasonable
under the unique circumstances of this case.
When Mr. Ong was first pulled over, he parked his car on the side of the road in a
residential area. (See Video 1 at 00:55 – 01:05.) The video recording of the stop plainly reveals
that other cars were similarly parked for the night, and that his parking job was appropriate and
lawful. (See Video 1 at 0:55 – 01:05; Video 2 at 35:14 – 35:32, 36:37 – 36:45.) In fact, Officer
Herbig specifically admitted the car was lawfully parked. (Tr., p.36, Ls.17-20.)
While the State attempted to justify the decision to impound Mr. Ong’s vehicle based on
Officer Herbig’s after-the-fact claim that the Coeur d’Alene neighborhood in question was a
“high crime area” insofar as he claims to have been told it had a higher rate of car burglaries than
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other parts of Coeur d’Alene (see Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.11, L.16, p.18, Ls.2-9), that justification falls
flat. On cross-examination, Officer Herbig explained that his “high-crime area” claim was based
only on the incidences of car burglaries being high in that neighborhood relative to other
neighborhoods in Coeur d’Alene. (Tr., p.27, Ls.18-23, p.28, Ls.21-25.) Thus, he conceded that
if a neighborhood has only one car break-in, while the rest of Coeur d’Alene has none, the
former would qualify as a “high crime area” under his definition. (Tr., p.29, Ls.1-29.) Because
he admitted he could not be any more specific as to the actual crime rate in the neighborhood in
question (Tr., p.29, Ls.18-20), his testimony should not be construed as evidence of an objective
need to impound Mr. Ong’s vehicle in order to safeguard it. Indeed, the district court itself was
wisely skeptical of the State’s proffered “high crime area” justification (although it accepted it as
“a factor in the officer’s reason for impounding the vehicle” (Tr., p.74, Ls.17-22)):
Just by way of caution, the Court is concerned that the use of the term
“high-crime area” could be used as an excuse simply to impound vehicles, so as
to allow a ruse to search any and every vehicle that is left without a driver in order
to generally rummage around the vehicle as is not allowed under the Fourth
Amendment.
(Tr., p.74, Ls.3-9.)
Moreover, even if the neighborhood in question experiences more car burglaries than
other portions of Coeur d’Alene, that fact should not justify the police impounding an arrestee’s
vehicle lawfully parked there. As noted, the “inventory exception” is rooted in the police
officers’ “community caretaking function,” and may not be used as a pretext to rummage for
evidence. If Officer Herbig and his partner were truly concerned that the lawfully-parked,
locked cars on the street in question were so at risk of burglary that the community caretaking
function required towing one of them, they really should have towed all of them (which they
clearly did not do). The fact that they singled out the one vehicle for “community caretaking”

12

that was also connected to their hunch of drug activity suggests that the impoundment in this
case was a mere pretext for an unlawful search.
Additionally, while the district court rightfully found it significant that Mr. Ong’s vehicle
was registered to a third party—a woman who apparently lived in Washington (R., p.74)—that
fact actually cuts against the reasonableness of impounding the vehicle. To the extent that the
impoundment and inventorying of vehicles is permitted primarily to protect property owners, see
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, that objective was best served by leaving Mr. Ong’s vehicle right
where it was. The last thing any car owner—much less one who may have to travel from out-ofstate to retrieve her vehicle—ever wants to deal with is the significant hassle and exorbitant
expense of retrieving her vehicle from an impound lot. And that is to say nothing of the obvious
risk of vehicle damage attendant to the towing process itself.
Further, time was not of the essence in this case. Even assuming the registered owner of
the vehicle had to travel from Washington to retrieve her car, the car was parked on a public
street. It certainly could have sat there for the day or two needed for the owner to retrieve it.
Finally, the fact that Mr. Ong did not have insurance for the vehicle is irrelevant.
Assuming it was not his vehicle, of course he would not have insurance on it; the registered
owner would. The State presented no evidence whatsoever suggesting the vehicle was not
insured by someone else.
Under all of these circumstances, the present case is similar to Foster, supra. There, the
Court of Appeals held that it was unreasonable for police to impound a vehicle where that
vehicle was left parked in the driveway of an acquaintance, and there was no indication that the
acquaintance objected to the vehicle being there. Foster, 127 Idaho at 727-28. Likewise, here,
Mr. Ong’s car was properly parked in a place where it did not present a hazard, and no one
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objected to its presence.

Therefore, a similar result to Foster should obtain, and this Court

should hold that the impoundment (and subsequent "inventory" search) of Mr. Ong's car was
impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.

II.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Ong's Motion To Dismiss
Although Mr. Ong is mindful of the fact that he ultimately had the opportunity to file a
suppression motion in the district court, have a hearing on that motion, and receive a decision on
the merits of that motion, he nevertheless contends that it was error for the district court not to
have dismissed his case based on the magistrate's unwillingness to take evidence on the
suppression issue at his preliminary hearing.
At his preliminary hearing, the presiding magistrate refused to allow Mr. Ong to develop
the evidence necessary to demonstrate the illegality of the police search of his vehicle, ruling that
such evidence was irrelevant at the preliminary hearing stage of a case. (Prelim. Tr., p.13, Ls.38; see also Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.7-11 (suggesting that the defense's concerns were best raised
through a suppression motion filed in the district court).) After he was bound over to the district
court, he sought dismissal of the case-partly because the magistrate's decision to exclude such
evidence violated Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 (R., pp.69-73); however, the district court denied that
motion (Tr., p.66, L.22 - p.67, L.4). Mr. Ong contends the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss.
The Idaho Criminal Rules provide that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to
determine whether "a public offense has been committed" and whether "there is probable or
sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense .... " I.C.R. 5.l(b); accord
State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491 (2014) ("The function of a preliminary hearing in Idaho is to
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determine if an offense has been committed, and further if there is probable cause to believe that
the crime was committed by the accused.”). “The finding of probable cause must be based on
substantial evidence on every material element of the offense charged.” Id. Thus, evidence
going to the guilt or innocence of the defendant is undoubtedly relevant to the inquiry at a
preliminary hearing.
However, evidence relating the defendant’s guilt or innocence is not the only evidence
that is relevant. In weighing the evidence and making its probable cause determination, the
magistrate court is required to exclude from its analysis all evidence obtained through violation
of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights:
Motions to suppress must be made in a trial court as provided in Rule 12.
However, if at the preliminary hearing the evidence shows facts which would
ultimately require suppression of evidence sought to be used against the
defendant, the evidence must be excluded and must not be considered by the
magistrate in determining probable cause.
I.C.R. 5.1(b) (emphasis added). Thus, evidence bearing on the legality of the police seizures
and/or searches that led to discovery of the evidence used against the defendant is also relevant
to the magistrate court’s inquiry. Accordingly, in this case, the magistrate erred in precluding
Mr. Ong from developing the evidence necessary to demonstrate the illegality of the police
search of his vehicle—which, of course, led to the discovery of the methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia underlying his felony charge and one of his misdemeanor charges.
Because the presiding magistrate erred in excluding relevant evidence at Mr. Ong’s
preliminary hearing, and this error could have had an impact on the magistrate’s ultimate
probable cause determination, the district court erred in denying Mr. Ong’s motion to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Ong respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgments of conviction, reverse the district court's order denying his suppression motion and/or
his motion to dismiss, and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 11 th day of September, 2019.

I sf Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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